
You miss the days of faxes, when you could hold the paper in your hands and when things were a little slower, but you can't go back to them, you can't fall behind, you can't pass up an opportunity, and if you don't respond quickly at all times somebody else will beat you to it, even if you have no idea what it is.
-Mark Helprin, The Acceleration of Tranquility.
Like Mark Helprin's character in The Acceleration of Tranquility, the recording industry longed for the days when they alone controlled the distribution of music with an iron fist, and made a pretty penny doing it. Unlike Helprin's narration, however, they did not respond quickly to the challenge of Napster, and when they finally did respond, it was to lash out at the very technology which was changing the world of music and entertainment as we knew it. I left off this saga of the nerds' revolution with the lawsuit that brought down Napster, ultimately resulting in it becoming (as commenter Jgibby noted on my last blog) what it is today: just a second-rate iTunes. The RIAA had won, or so they thought. But often times nothing fuels a revolution like persecution, and that is exactly what the RIAA's action was perceived as by many who had grown to love Napster.
This is the story of their response.
As noted in Digital Capital: harnessing the power of business webs, "Business must provide a pertinent, attractive, and convenient total experience." The entertainment industry was failing to do this by not embracing the technology that would make that experience possible. Instead they were literally suing those who tried to create it. This was bad business, and it once again created a gap that was aching to be filled. That "fill" would come in the form of peer-to-peer networks.
As I mentioned in my last blog, Napster's unified structure (complete with a central server) made it vulnerable to legal attacks. At first, the solution was simply to make a multitude of different services similar to that provided by Napster. These were creations such as Morpheus, Limewire, Bearshare, and the original Audiogalaxy as well as many more. These all implemented similar frameworks to Napster, but each was individually smaller than Napster and so the RIAA had no single target, but what was now a series of moving targets that kept changing over time. Beginning artists who found fame through these networks (such as Linkin Park) embraced the idea of using these peer-to-peer (P2P) networks as a way for bands to get their music to a greater audience. This was changing the inherent nature of music. This easy P2P-based access to music eroded any concept of music-as-property for many people. It also gave users a previously unheard of role in distribution and production of music. The music industry liked none of this.
So they sued. They sought injunctions, copyright violation charges, and punitive damages. They even began suing not just the file sharing services, but the very people who used them. This bares repeating: the music industry sued their own fans. If you type in "RIAA sues people" into any search engine, you will see news story after news story about their litigious assaults."RIAA sues 261 file swappers"; "RIAA Sues Woman Who Has No Computer For Sharing Music"; "RIAA sues transplant patient"; "12-Year-Old Sued for Music Downloading." These headlines would seem comical if they weren't true. Although the total number of people they have sued is in dispute (some estimates put it at upwards of 35,00 people, while the industry says closer to 18,000). What is known, however, is that over 30,000 individual suits have been filed by the RIAA, and the average settlement is between $3000 and $5000 dollars. That's around $50 million in settlements alone. What is even more shocking, though, is that they are actually loosing money. The cost of litigation and the fact that many of the plaintiffs in these cases are unable to pay the full amount of the settlement at the time of the agreement, has led to a net loss on their cases. More than simply losing money, the industry is losing sight of the goals of their business, and in spite of their failure to embrace new technology, users were more than ready to exactly that in order to escape the legal battle.
In my final installment of this blog, I will talk about the technology that rose to prominence largely as a result of this misguided war launched by the RIAA. It will discuss the current technology which makes DRM so difficult; and it will provide support for Digital Capital: harnessing the power of business webs' statement that "...An oligarchy of industrial-age record companies and broadcast networks like RCA and CBS controlled the music distribution business. Today, their domination is in tatters." Lastly it will ponder the future of DRM in the years to come.
All this and more, in the third installment of Revenge of the Nerds.

